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Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice 
theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding 
identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of iden-
tity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist ratio-
nal choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action 
because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. 
However, internalist theorists tend to reduce identity to desire—the desire of 
a person to express his or her social being. From an internalist point of view, 
that is, from a viewpoint in which not only desires but also beliefs play a key 
role in social explanations as mental entities, this article rejects externalist 
reductionism and proposes a redefinition of social identity as a net of beliefs 
about oneself, beliefs that are indexical, robust, and socially shaped.
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The theory of rational choice can be interpreted from two epistemologi-cal approaches: an internalist one and an externalist one. According to 
the first, the agent’s preferences and beliefs are mental states that constitute 
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reasons for action, while the second solely considers the preferences revealed 
in the action and certain behavioral hypotheses, neither of which entails 
delving into the minds of individuals. Although both approaches are neutral 
with respect to formal models of rational choice, they diverge when the 
paradigm is expanded to incorporate motives that are expressive of or 
derived from the identities of individuals. In this article, we argue that the 
internalist conception of rational choice is the only interpretation that can 
be extended to include identity-based preferences or desires. However, this 
proves to be insufficient since at the same time we hold that people’s social 
identity has less to do with preferences or desires than with their beliefs 
about themselves and the world. These beliefs can be distributed into prac-
tical syllogisms whose conclusions are reasons for action in the form of 
desires to act or obligations to act. In the last part of this article we explore 
the nature of identity beliefs, that is, their indexation, robustness, and emo-
tional dimension, among other properties, with a view to demonstrating the 
difficulties involved in incorporating all of these complex dimensions in the 
paradigm of rational choice, even when the model is interpreted from an 
internalist approach. Furthermore, given the essentially linguistic and cul-
tural nature of practical identity syllogisms, we underscore in the conclu-
sions the importance of analyzing language to understand this aspect of 
human behavior that appears to respond to what individuals claim to be.
Two Approaches to Rational Choice: 
Internalist and Externalist
The so-called canonical paradigm of rational choice theory (Bell, Raiffa, 
and Tversky 1988, 18) explains all social action in terms of the decisions 
made by an individual or a group of individuals in a given context, the 
consequences of those decisions, and an assumption about the individuals’ 
reasons for having made the decision, namely that individuals will try to 
maximize their benefits (whatever that benefit may be). For a choice to be 
made, the agent must face a set of possible options (her feasible set). It is 
assumed that given her feasible set, the agent will choose the option that leads 
to—or she believes leads to—the best outcome. If she has full information 
about the outcome of her decisions, she will find herself in a situation of 
certainty and be able to maximize her utility. If the information is incomplete, 
however, she will only be able to maximize the expected utility in a context 
of risk and uncertainty. In this situation, she will attribute an objective or 
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subjective probability to the outcome of her action. This probability is the 
belief she has about the results of her action.
Formal decision theory holds that if a person chooses X instead of Y, she 
prefers X to Y, but it does not consider the nature of individual preferences, 
nor why people prefer some things to others. From a formal perspective, the 
only thing that matters is that these preferences satisfy certain basic criteria 
of logical consistency, particularly transitivity and completeness. If these 
requisites are violated, it will be impossible to know what the people prefer; 
their preferences cannot be ranked or ordered, and the decision theorist will 
assume that the people did not choose rationally.
This formal foundation of rational choice theory gives rise to two 
distinct interpretations regarding the behavior of individuals: one that is 
internal to the individual and another that is external. The internalist 
interpretation of rational choice holds that the theory describes “what is 
actually going on inside us when we reason” (Satz and Ferejohn 1994, 73). 
But this internalist approach also assumes that mental entities—the desires 
and beliefs on which individual preferences are based—are causally linked 
to the individual’s decision given that they provide reasons for action: 
beliefs and desires are mental states that motivate the individual and 
causally explain her action (Williams 1981; Boudon 2003; Landa 2004; 
Hedström 2005, 2006). If a person chooses X instead of Y, it is because she 
believes that X best satisfies her desires. These internal beliefs and desires, 
which are subjective, prompt her action.1 
From the internalist perspective, rational choice theory is both explanatory 
and normative at the same time (Hausman 2001, 320; Landa 2004). By 
relying on individual beliefs, desires, and preferences and the role they play 
as reasons for action, the theory not only explains individual behavior—
why individuals choose as they do—but also justifies these decisions from 
a normative standpoint insofar as they are the best ones that an individual 
can make to maximize her interest, provided, of course, that she has 
sufficient information and is not deceiving herself (Davidson 1980, 21; 
elster 1989, 25). Nevertheless, this conception would prove to be inconsistent 
if it were not founded on an explicit psychological realism regarding the 
mental entities or states that constitute the basic pieces of any explanation 
1. The philosophical debate on the internal nature of reasons for action has revolved around 
the position of Bernard Williams (1981). According to Williams, the only way to satisfy the 
conditions of truth of the proposition “X has a reason R to do A” is by appealing to what he 
calls the subjective motivational set of agent X. Although Williams’s theory clearly has 
Humean roots, he diverges from Hume as he does not consider that only desires have motiva-
tional force. A subject’s motivational set includes desires, emotions, personal loyalties, proj-
ects, commitments, and so on (Williams 1981, 105).
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in terms of rational choice (Hausman 1995, 100). For the internalist, 
“beliefs,” “desires,” and “preferences” are not mere labels, nor simple 
theoretical constructions that aid us to understand human conduct, nor 
constructs that have no real correlation to what is going on in our minds, 
but are instead real events in the intentional processes of the human mind. 
As Boudon (2003, 3, emphasis added) formulates it, “Any action is caused 
by reasons in the mind of individuals (rationality).” Preferences, desires, 
and beliefs thus form the building blocks of folk psychology defended by 
internalism. given that these preferences can be ranked and represented as 
utility functions, the internalist interpretation of rational choice 
mathematically transforms this folk psychology into a theory of utility 
maximization (Hausman 2000, 114).
The externalist, on the other hand, categorically rejects each of these 
psychological assumptions. The externalist interpretation of rational choice 
theory rests on an instrumental conception of the basic terms of the theory 
since it considers that the external, observable conduct of individuals is the 
only thing that can be taken into account. What goes on inside of each of our 
heads is of no interest to the social scientist; it is a black box that need not be 
opened to obtain genuine explanations (Börgers 1996). “Beliefs” and 
“preferences” (which are not desires) are mere labels that we use to describe 
individual action, but they are not real mental representations, or even if they 
are they add nothing to the explanation: “Reference to preferences as 
representations of something ‘inside the head’ . . . is not necessary” (Dowding 
2007, 12; also see Satz and Ferejohn 1994, 76). To explain individual action, 
it is therefore unnecessary to account for the individual’s reasons for action. 
If a person chooses X instead of Y, we say that she “prefers” X to Y where 
that preference is revealed by the individual when deciding about a mere 
binary relation (Samuelson 1948; Sen 1971). Beliefs are interpreted as mere 
probabilities that a decision will lead to certain outcomes rather than others. 
Thus, given a person’s preferences and beliefs, it is assumed that she will act 
as if she is maximizing her interest (Friedman 1953; Hardin 1982). The 
externalist conception, then, denies that rational choice theory is a normative 
theory. According to the externalists, it is simply a descriptive theory that 
explains actions instrumentally but does not rely on mental representations or 
the internal reasons for action. Reasons are always external; the researcher 
attributes or assigns them to the individual, and they are determined by the 
underlying parameters of the social structure—the market, the family, the 
political party, social norms, the state, and so on—in which the individual 
interacts with others (Satz and Ferejohn 1994, 77).
While the formal component of rational choice theory is the same for 
both externalists and internalists, it is the interpretation of that component 
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that differs. For the internalists, beliefs, desires, and preferences are actual 
mental entities having motivational force, whereas for the externalists they 
are little more than instrumental concepts that describe external conduct, 
that is, the observable behavior influenced by contextual variables. However, 
these two divergent interpretations of rational choice theory do not always 
achieve different results: this divergence in the theory’s foundations need 
not influence the models or the outcome of research. But this is not always 
so. In contrast to what is often said in other spheres of sociological theory 
about the problem of social identity, rational choice theorists do not share 
the same view. Indeed, in this case a divergent interpretation of the theory’s 
foundations also leads to a different position with regard to the possibility 
of including identity in the models. As we see below, externalists and 
internalists approach the question of identity in different ways. While the 
former deny its utility, the latter attempt to include it in their models.
Rational Choice and Social Identity
Before turning to the question of how the internalist and the externalist 
interpretations of rational choice deal with social identity, let us take a 
moment to explore the very concept of identity, as it is sufficiently ambi-
guous to merit a definition.
An Initial Instrumental Approach to Social Identity
The literature on social identity is so vast that one might be tempted to 
believe that it is founded on a perfectly well-defined concept that is widely 
accepted among researchers. Yet this is not so, and in many cases social 
identity not only is vague, ambiguous, and enigmatic (Fearon 1999, 1) but 
also is made to do a great deal of work (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 8; 
MacInnes 2004). The concept of identity has been employed to analyze 
noninstrumental, expressive modes of action that assumedly aid us in 
understanding participation in social movements (Melucci 1994). It has 
been used in turn to explain the fragmented nature of the contemporary 
self (giddens 1991) and to reject that the contemporary self is frag-
mented (Rinken 2000). Identity has been interpreted as a fuzzy set of roles 
(Montgomery 2000), as a source of individual security and stability 
(Woodward 2003), and as a process of self-categorization that creates 
meaningful group boundaries that, depending on the context, may exacerbate 
the contrast with other groups through stereotyping and prejudice (Turner 
et al. 1987). And these are but a few of the examples chosen at random.
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In spite of its enormous heterogeneity, social identity can be defined 
as “(a) a social category, defined by membership rules and allegedly 
characteristic attributes or expected behaviors or (b) a socially distinguishing 
feature that a person takes special pride in or views as unchangeable but 
socially consequential” or both things at the same time (Fearon 1999, 36).2 
As a social category and a socially distinguishing feature, identity is, as 
well, a process of self-categorization and self-understanding (Turner et al. 
1987), of identifying with others, and of commonality, connectedness, and 
groupness (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 14-21). These are processes that 
permit the members of a group or collective to mutually recognize each other 
as such and define their social self (i.e., to respond to the questions “Who am 
I?” and “Who are we?”; Stryker 1980, 385; Callero 1985, 205; gusfield, 
Johnston, and Laraña 1994; Calvert 2000). This process of self-categorization 
and mutual recognition, which is a social-cognitive process, shapes the 
perceptions and motivations of individuals and can result in increased 
intragroup cooperation and/or intergroup conflict.3  For example, pride at 
belonging to a club—or any other identity group—may prompt us to defend 
our club against other clubs or groups even when this involves a personal cost 
to ourselves (Orbell et al 1988). Likewise, prejudice toward another group 
may lead us to confront it when it would be more rational and beneficial to 
cooperate. It is generally thought that identity is a motivational factor that 
explains actions focused inward to the group—usually cooperative action—
and outward—which tends to be conflictive. Rational choice theory has no 
difficulties in explaining conflict—in terms of a conflict of interests—but 
given the theory’s fundamental assumption of self-interest, it encounters 
serious problems for explaining cooperation and, in general, any behavior 
that does not wed with the selfish dictates of private utility maximization. 
From the behavior of the median voter to the selfless and self-sacrificing 
revolutionary activist, from individual action undertaken in the name of social 
class or race to the action that puts group welfare before individual welfare, 
there is a whole rainbow of behaviors that standard rational choice theory 
2. We lean on James Fearon (1999) because he proposes a useful synthetic definition after 
analyzing a representative set of identity definitions. (Fearon’s text is a draft. We thank the 
author for allowing us to cite it.)
3. In social psychology experiments to study if group identity explains cooperative behavior, 
it has been shown that conversations among individuals reinforce group identity—the sense of 
belonging to the group, of being “one of us” and not “one of them”—as well as promoting 
cooperation. Furthermore, even in experiments in which a group of strangers is assigned an 
arbitrary identity trait (e.g., those who have a red symbol versus those who have a yellow one), 
this trait generates group identity (Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes 1988).
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would claim to be incomprehensible because of their irrationality and hence 
would exclude them from the explanatory sphere.
In contrast, identity theories assume that individual or collective social 
action is governed by “particularistic self-understandings [of a noninstrumental 
nature] rather than by putatively universal self-interest” (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000, 6; Cohen 1985) and can therefore move social agents to 
perform actions that transcend their own interests and that are inexplicable 
from the standpoint of orthodox rational choice. Thus, it seems that identity 
provides an interesting heuristic tool that can serve to bridge certain 
explanatory gaps in the rational choice paradigm, which is otherwise very 
powerful. For this reason, in what follows we explore the question of 
whether and how it is possible to unify the two approaches to social action 
or, to put it another way, if it is possible, and how, for rational choice theory 
to incorporate (some of) the assumptions of identity theories. However, as 
we stated above, this will depend on whether rational choice theory is 
interpreted from an internalist or an externalist approach.
External Reasons, Rational Choice, and Identity
The externalist conception of rational choice has sound arguments for 
rejecting both the criticisms of identity theorists as well as the use of the 
concept of identity. Yet as we see in the following section, their arguments are 
not conclusive. The rejection of identity theories stems from the fact that the 
causal relationship between identity and action is an obscure one, and on 
many occasions identity theorists accept the theory as fact rather than 
providing evidence for it, attributing an explanatory power to identity that it 
lacks unless it is made explicit (MacInnes 2004, 533; de Francisco and 
Aguiar 2005, 13). For this reason, externalists often view explanations for 
social action in terms of supposed gender, ethnic, or class identities as being 
little more than just another way of saying that individuals share interests and 
preferences with the members of a group (Hardin 1995, 10; Laitin 1998).4  
From the viewpoint of external reasons, it is held that the theories of social 
identity needlessly multiple the reasons for action. The externalist would say 
that identity must rely on the individual’s internal processes, on why the 
4. According to Hardin, individuals identify those who share their interests, but identifica-
tion is not the same as identity: “If we did not have identifications, that is, commitments, it 
would not matter so much that we have the quasi-objective identities we have—I as an Anglo-
Saxon-Celtic-Huguenot-Hillbilly-Texas-American, you as Tutsi, Serb, or whatever” (Hardin 
1995, 7). Identity would be none other than preferences and norms or rules of cooperation. In 
this same sense, and also from an externalist perspective, see Bicchieri (2002).
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social agent states that she is together with others, on her way of understanding 
herself, on the image that she has of herself, that is, on reasons for action that 
are accessible only to the social agent herself. The social scientist—the 
externalist would add—lacks this privileged access and can rely on only the 
observable behavior of individuals embedded in the core of social structures. 
But unlike preferences, identity is not revealed in the action; it has to be 
overtly expressed. For the externalist, however, resorting to verbal affirmations 
about what individuals say they are involves making post hoc justifications 
about the social action, justifications that do not explain it. That the social 
scientist attributes an identity to an individual is not justified either if we 
accept that the only thing we have to rely on is the action of individuals or 
their aggregate effects.5 
If the identity were revealed in the action, it could be reduced to mere 
preferences (revealed) about possible options: to join or not to join a cause, 
to go or not to go on strike, to demonstrate or not to demonstrate. As an 
essentialist and internalist concept of identity, it adds nothing to the explanation 
of these social events; it is enough to analyze the revealed preferences. Those 
who claim, for example, that a female worker takes part in a strike because of 
her class identity do not explain anything as they are resorting to an obscure 
internal entity of the individual—the identity or the conscience—without an 
apparent causal force on the action. If a person or a group of people declare 
that they take part in a collective action to promote equality, the externalist 
theorist of rational choice would say that the agents are attempting to satisfy 
their preferences (their taste for fairness) but that the action does not involve 
any type of internal process or definition of what one is—“I am egalitarian”—
together with others. The action can be explained in the instrumental manner 
the externalist wishes (Friedman 1953; Coleman 1990).
According to this methodological approach, sociological theories of 
identity explain little with many assumptions: identity neither explains social 
action nor is a clear concept. At the same time, it is held that the internalist 
theory of rational choice adds needless assumptions: the externalist believes 
that the psychological realism of the internalist is unnecessary and that the 
formal theory of instrumental rationality is sufficient to explain all types of 
social phenomena. The external reasons—costs and benefits—are enough to 
construct hypotheses; it is not necessary to delve into the minds of individuals, 
their internal reasons for action, or their identity.
5. In other words, the externalist does not accept the utility of the concept of identity as 
either a category of practice (the individuals themselves refer to their identity) or a category 
of analysis (the social researcher assigns identities that may or may not coincide with those 
given by the social agents). For more on this distinction, see Brubaker and Cooper (2000, 4).
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Internal Reasons, Rational Choice, and Identity
Yet by excluding internal reasons, a wide range of social events is left 
unexplained, and the externalist must deal with this limitation. The most 
well-known and widely studied case is that of the voter’s paradox. Why do 
people turn out to vote if the individual benefit to be gained from voting is 
negligible compared to the costs? As the political scientist Morris Fiorina 
(1976, 410) contends, “expressive factors probably dominate instrumental 
factors as an explanation of turnout.” If we are to confront the challenge 
posed by identity theories without leaving the sphere of rational choice, we 
must consider how identity—the social category to which one belongs and/
or the socially distinguishing feature in which a person takes special pride—is 
expressed as a further argument of a voter’s utility function. This function 
would be composed of instrumental elements (voting for the party that best 
represents my interests) and of noninstrumental elements that are expressive 
and serve purposes of identification (voting because it is a civic duty, voting 
to express what one is) (Calvert 2002, 593). For expressive voters, “voting is 
a means to express political beliefs and preferences and, in doing so, to estab-
lish or reaffirm their own political identity” (Schuessler 2000, 88).6  From the 
standpoint of internalist rational choice, the explanation for social phenom-
ena proves to be very weak (albeit parsimonious) if it is restricted to assuming 
that people act as if their reasons were only instrumental and selfish. Mixed 
models à la Margolis (1982), those that include both instrumental and expres-
sive motivations, have undoubtedly done much to advance the development 
of rational choice theory by permitting the incorporation of such issues as the 
agent’s social identity, issues that were excluded from the realm of conven-
tional Beckerian or Olsonian models of rational choice.7  However, it would 
be wrong to assume that these modifications never affect the theory. As we 
6. For an in-depth review of how rational choice theory has dealt with the problem of social 
identity in political science, see Calvert (2000).
7. It is questionable whether expressive motivations are actually excluded from the classic 
Olsonian models given that such motivations represent a sort of internal selective incentive. 
This is a solution that Olson himself considered and rejected. The person who gives money to 
a charitable organization states that she does so not because she believes that the money will 
have a large influence but because she obtains “an individual, noncollective satisfaction in the 
form of a feeling of personal moral worth, or because of a desire for respectability or praise” 
(Olson 1965, 160, n. 91). However, by considering any decision based on selective incentives 
of any kind as being rational, the theory becomes vacant of content because “this theory (or 
any theory) becomes correct simply by virtue of its logical consistency, and is no longer 
capable of empirical refutation” (Olson 1965, 160, n. 91). If an individual always maximizes 
her internal or external utility no matter what she does, the theory is worthless. This is a risk 
that internalist models run if they reduce all motives for action to a mere internal utility.
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have already said, in the case of identity—which only the internalists seem to 
be interested in incorporating into rational choice theory—there has been a 
notable turnaround regarding some of the classic topics of rational choice:
If . . . voting for a candidate is expressively motivated—which is to say, the 
returns to the voter are existential rather than instrumental—then there is no 
collective action problem. While there is a public dimension to the instru-
mental efficacy of the vote (in that voters and non-voters alike partake in its 
electoral consequences), the existential consequence of voting is wholly 
internal. It is only the voter herself that can point to her electoral deed and 
legitimately draw her political identification from it: to be Democrat, she has 
to vote Democrat. It is not that the collective action problem has in any way 
been solved. It is simply that under expressive motivation, free-riding is no 
longer an appropriate analytical prism with which to view voting, as you 
cannot free-ride on expressive identification. (Schuessler 2000, 91)
Rational action based on identity (being a Democrat) can be understood 
only by relying on the voter’s internal reasons, which express what she is 
when she votes. We could say that Schuessler’s voter creates a practical 
syllogism “in her head” whose minor premise is existential: her own iden-
tity. The syllogism would therefore be as follows: Democrats vote for the 
Democratic Party (major premise), I am a Democrat (minor identitarian 
premise), so I vote for the Democratic Party (conclusion).8  Thus, the person 
who defines herself as a Democrat has an internal reason to vote for the 
Democrats, namely, her own practical coherence. By expressing her iden-
tity through voting, she does honor not only to what she is but also to her 
own rationality, given the meanings she assigns to certain events in the 
world—in this case, the fact of being a Democrat.
In contrast, to explain voting for externalist reasons, instrumental 
motives are sufficient: voters vote for the Democrats because it benefits 
them. Although this is important, it is insufficient to explain the voter’s 
paradox. People need expressive—internal—motivations to manifest what 
they are. But when one expresses what one is, one cannot be a free rider of 
oneself. This is Schuessler’s argument, an argument that cannot be wholly 
understood if we do not accept that his conception of rational choice is 
based on the existence of internal reasons (although the author does not 
refer to them as such).
8. For a similar argument on identity—understood as a set of roles—and on action, see 
James D. Montgomery (2000).
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In their proposal to construct a utility function that permits economics to 
account for social identity, george Akerlof and Rachel Kranton do not refer to 
“internal reasons” either. But their analysis is an interesting essay that 
transports economic theory to the internalist terrain as the authors propose “a 
utility function that incorporates identity as a motivation for behavior” 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 718, emphasis added). Departing from the 
empirical evidence on the weight of social identity in economic and non-
economic conduct, Akerlof and Kranton were the first to introduce the 
concept of identity in an economic analysis. In Akerlof and Kranton’s 
proposal, the utility of individual j is a function of j’s actions, of the actions of 
others, and of identity I or j’s self-image. On one hand, identity is based on the 
social category that others attribute to a given person, while on the other, it is 
based on the “degree to which the traits εj of j coincide with the ideal social 
category that others attribute to him, which is indicated by prescription 
P” (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 719). Social identity therefore involves 
accommodating one’s own image and thus one’s own actions to that ideal. 
Insofar as individuals internalize the code of conduct linked to a prescribed 
behavior, feelings of anxiety and cognitive dissonance may be evoked when 
violating the prescription. Likewise, the person may have a higher sense of self 
when accommodating the behavior prescribed by the reference group. 
Nonetheless, as Akerlof and Kranton point out, general agreement does not 
exist regarding social categories and prescriptions, thus providing the individual 
the option to choose her identity.
What emerges from Akerlof and Kranton’s proposal is that if the 
internalist interpretation of identity is excluded from utility functions, 
economics in particular and rational choice theory in general will be unable 
to explain certain social phenomena. As an example, both authors point out 
that the feminist movement’s struggle for equal rights has influenced the 
job market since, by transforming the social notions of femininity and 
masculinity, women have come to view working outside the home not only 
as an economic gain but also especially as a “gain in identity” (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000, 719).9 
9. In the first article in which they really apply their model empirically (Akerlof and Kranton 
2002), the authors demonstrate that students’ performance depends on their identity, that is, 
the social category that is attributed to them (“crowd leaders,” “nerds,” or “burnouts”) and how 
they accommodate their self-image to this category. To maximize their utility, students must 
not only maximize their effort but also fit into a category. In a second study, they show how 
workers’ efficiency improves when they assume the values and principles of their company 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2005).
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Needless to say, this is far removed from the methodological assumptions 
of Friedman and the externalist conception of identity and rational choice. 
Identity-based preferences provide reasons for action that can be understood 
only in terms of internal reasons and, therefore, by assuming a certain 
psychological realism. Staying at home involves not only external costs to 
women—to not earn a salary, to engage in certain tasks for reasons of gender, 
and so on—but also internal costs related to what they are, the way they 
conceive of themselves, their image understood as self-understanding. Women 
who are employed obtain not only external benefits—independence, income, 
relationships, and so on—but also internal benefits related to what it means to 
be a woman in their actual context. Working outside the home has external 
compensations that could lead to a rational maximization of utilities; but it also 
resolves a practical syllogism whose major premise would be “women today 
work outside the home” and whose minor premise would once again be 
existential and serve purposes of identification, “I am a woman.” Here, the 
rationality of action is measured in terms of corres pondence with, or 
accommodation to, (socially) typified forms of behavior recognized by the 
agent. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 719) spoke of coinciding “with the ideal 
social category that others attribute to him.” In short, we can say that identity 
forms part of the agent’s internal motives or reasons for action. It would seem 
then that the internalist approach to rational choice theory explains a larger 
number of social phenomena than does the externalist interpretation. However, 
as we see below, the internalist interpretation has its own limitations.
Social Identity: Beliefs about 
Oneself and Rational Choice
According to the internalist theory of rational choice, an action is rational 
if it is subject to a threefold process of optimization. First, the action must 
be the best means to fulfilling the agent’s desires given her beliefs about 
the means–ends relationship. Second, beliefs must be optimal given the 
information available to the agent. Finally, agents will attempt to optimize 
their information bearing in mind their previous beliefs about the cost of 
obtaining that information. If this optimization process fails in any way, the 
relationship between beliefs and desires will be blocked and the action will 
have no foundation in rationality (elster 1989; Hedström 2005, 2006). Beliefs 
and desires are, as we have said, the building blocks of the explanatory 
arguments of action based on individual rationality.
The internalist, then, has two options for incorporating social identity 
into rational choice theory: by conceiving of identity either as a set of 
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desires or as a set of beliefs.10 Whenever rational choice has attempted to 
include identity, it has taken the first road. In this sense, it is understood that 
individuals not only want to maximize their benefits but also, as Schuessler 
argues, desire to express their selves, that is, to act in accordance with their 
social identity. Rational choice theory can therefore include the desire to 
express identity as yet another argument of the utility function. Voters not 
only would want the party that benefits them most (e.g., by cutting taxes) to 
win but also would desire to express their identity through the action of 
voting. The formal analysis must reflect both types of desires.
While this solution proves to be plausible from a formal viewpoint and 
constitutes a step forward for rational choice theory, from a conceptual 
perspective loose ends remain to be tied since the desire to express identity is 
not the same as identity, which is what is expressed (just as the desire to drink 
water when one is thirsty is not the same as thirst). What then is identity? As 
Akerlof and Kranton point out in a somewhat conceptually denser way, 
identity can be the result of social categorization as well as the image we have 
of ourselves. But what does the visual metaphor of “self-image” mean in this 
case? The image or idea that one has of oneself can be more complex than 
the mere desire to express it, which is what identity comes down to in some 
models. However, when making their concept operational, Akerlof and 
Kranton tend to reduce identity to identity-based preferences that are 
interiorized by the social agents, so that, once again, the very concept of 
identity is overshadowed by others. But if desires provide reasons for action 
based on beliefs in the internalist scheme of rational choice, is identity—
regardless of how it is expressed—a type of desire?
given the nature of desires, it proves impossible to define a person’s 
social identity as that person’s set of desires. Although desires can be 
involved in shaping one’s social identity (wishing to be something can be a 
strong reason for being it or attempting to be it), they cannot define it. If 
desire is considered a reason for action (x desires z and, given her beliefs, 
does action d to satisfy z), identity cannot be understood as a desire but 
rather as a source of desires.11 Desire in itself is not identity; it does not 
10. Why not both, that is, a set of desires and beliefs? As we are going to see, we reject defin-
ing social identity as a set of desires.
11. If someone desires to be a pianist, at first glance we might think that this desire defines the 
person, defines (part of) her identity. However, the desire is not understandable without a set 
of beliefs that backs it and truly defines the person—her belief about her capacity to be a 
pianist, her belief about her capacity for working hard, and so on. Very much the same could 
be said of preferences. The fact that someone strictly prefers X to Y may be an expression of 
her identity but would not be identity itself.
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define it insofar as desires have to do with how we want the world to be 
(Searle 1983, 54; Searle 2001), while social identity has to do with how the 
world is, that part of the world that is us.
While desires refer to how we want the world to be, beliefs have to 
do with how we believe the world is (whether or not we are right). 
We believe that the earth is round, we do not desire it to be round.12 We 
desire an orange juice, and we believe that what is placed before us is a 
real orange and not a wax or wooden one. We want a pay raise, and we 
believe that going on strike is the best way to achieve it. The difference 
between the mental state we call “belief” and the mental state we call 
“desire” lies in the direction of fit with respect to the world (Anscombe 
1957; Humberstone 1992): beliefs are directed at the world; they are 
representations about the world, and they tell us how it is (whether it is 
true or not). Desires, on the other hand, indicate how the world should be 
for it to satisfy us. Desires can be rational or irrational, but it makes no 
sense to say that they are true or false. Beliefs can be rational or irrational 
but also true or false. Moreover, the concepts of belief and truth are 
closely related in the case of both implicit and explicit beliefs (Falk 2004; 
Schwitzgebel 2006).13 
If it is not possible to consider social identity a set of desires, it fits into 
the internalist scheme of rational choice only by considering it a set of 
beliefs. But what type of beliefs are they? How are they shaped? What 
relationship do they have with truth? And what relationship do they have 
with social action? If beliefs are mental representations about how the 
world is, identity must be considered the persons’ set of beliefs about 
themselves shaped by beliefs about the concrete portion of the world to 
which they belong. Social identity—race, gender, class, and so on—will be 
a person’s set of beliefs about herself as, for example, a black working-class 
woman. In what follows, we explore some of the implications of this 
eminently epistemic conception of social identity. These implications are 
summed up in the following four theses.
12. In reality one can desire anything: that the world be flat or that the sun be blue. But here 
we want to focus on desires based on well-informed beliefs and not on pure imagination or 
fantasy (although these often play a key social role). See Boudon (1994) on the social impor-
tance of false beliefs.
13. Beliefs are implicit when we do not mentally represent the contents of the proposition that 
expresses the belief (e.g., we believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, but we do not think about 
it). When the opposite occurs, the beliefs are explicit.
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1. The Beliefs That Shape Social Identity 
Are Explicit, Indexical, and Shared
If someone says, for example, “I am Christian,” she is expressing her 
religious identity through language. But that expression, like any other 
expression of identity, encompasses a complex stockpile of beliefs about 
the world. No one can declare herself to be Christian without holding a set 
of beliefs about what it means to be Christian. Thus, in general, a Christian 
person will believe in the existence of god, in the resurrection of souls, in 
universal sins; she will believe that it is her duty to go to mass on Sundays 
or be charitable to the needy and have compassion for those who suffer. She 
will believe this and many more things that constitute what it means for her 
to be Christian: “Christians—she will say—believe those things.” Identity, 
however, cannot be expressed solely through this set of beliefs. Indeed, 
another person may claim to share the same beliefs about Christians and not 
be Christian. Thus, she must have a further belief about herself, a clearly 
indexical, self-referential belief—I am X—that is linked to a set of explicit 
beliefs about what it means to be X. This indexical element of self-
referential belief and the explicitness of the beliefs about the meaning of 
identity are essential if the individual is to construct practical syllogisms 
through which identity becomes a motivational factor and beliefs establish 
a causal or intentional link with action. “Christians do x, y, z,” “I am 
Christian,” ergo, “I do x, y, z.” If beliefs were merely implicit, or there were 
no first-person pronoun to assign them to, it would be difficult for identity 
(now solely a diffuse and unattached identity) to motivate action (Chai 
2001, 83; Falk 2004, 238; Jervis 2006, 642). It is important to highlight the 
normative or prescriptive component of the practical identity syllogism: “I 
do x, y, z” is in reality “I should do x, y, z.” It is important to emphasize this 
normative component because practical syllogisms are often not respected 
and the individual does not do what they prescribe.14 
On the other hand, the set of beliefs that make sense of a particular social 
self—Christian, to use the same example—can only be a shared set of 
beliefs. If every Christian who declared herself to be a Christian believed 
different things about what it meant to be Christian, it would be impossible 
to speak of a religious identity. In contrast, sharing meanings is the basis of 
intragroup identification and contributes to reinforcing the beliefs that the 
members of the identity group have about the world and about themselves. 
14. One of the most widely studied phenomena in philosophy regarding the failure of the 
practical syllogism—from Aristotle to Davidson—is the akrasia or the weakness of will.
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The indexation of beliefs can thus move from the first-person singular to 
the first-person plural, that is, from the I to the we. When this is the case, 
identity will be expressed in the form of collective action: “We, the 
Christians, do [should do] x, y, z.”
2. The Beliefs Involved in Social 
Identity Are Robust Subjective Beliefs
One does not go to bed at night a Christian and wake up in the morning 
an atheist to once again become a Christian over afternoon tea. Social iden-
tities tend to be stable and are not usually subject to unexpected or sudden 
changes. This is because they are based on robust beliefs:
The belief is robust because it is, by the subject’s lights, evidentially 
extremely well supported, so well supported that it stands near the core of her 
web of belief. Such contrary evidence as comes in would be seen as requiring 
adjustments not with the belief itself, but elsewhere in the subject’s web of 
belief. At the other end of the spectrum, however, a subject’s belief might be 
robust because she is completely irrationally disposed to cling to her belief. 
(Sayre-McCord and Smith 2003, 4)15 
Robust beliefs are stable even when the individual receives new informa-
tion that allows her to reflect on them (when beliefs change easily under the 
impact of incoming information and reflection, they are fragile). At one 
extreme, there are beliefs—such as the belief in the existence of god—that 
transcend the available evidence and are maximally robust. In general, we 
can say that the more robust an individual’s beliefs, the more stable her 
social identity. Now, as the above text suggests, a robust belief is the prod-
uct of all the evidence that is available to a person according to her own 
viewpoint. Social identity, therefore, is not always constructed through a 
rational process of accumulating evidence, that is, one in which the infor-
mation that could falsify our belief is maximized. On occasion, even the 
most countervailing of facts will not cause people to renounce their social 
identity, to renounce what they believe to be.16 The subjective point of view 
is crucial to the formation of identity beliefs.
15. Sayre-McCord and Smith’s text is a draft. We thank the authors for allowing us to cite it.
16. For this reason identity conflicts—in the case of immigrants, for example—produce obvi-
ous cases of anomie in the sense of Durkheim. Changing one’s country is more or less easy; 
changing one’s identity is not: the web of beliefs about oneself and about one’s world that we 
call “identity” is too closely woven to substitute it rapidly for another. In the case of fragile 
beliefs, which produce fragile identities, it is a different matter altogether.
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This has two far-reaching consequences. The first is that social identity 
is not always based on rational beliefs. The second is that the relationship 
between truth and belief, in regard to social identity, becomes very complex 
given the subjectivity of the beliefs involved. On one hand, subjects believe 
that their beliefs are true: no people can define themselves socially through 
a set of beliefs about themselves and the world—beliefs shared with 
others—and immediately afterward add that these beliefs are false. Like all 
genuine beliefs, identity beliefs are also influenced by the parallel metabelief 
in their truth—“I believe that my beliefs are true.” But on the other hand, 
these are robust beliefs that easily stand up to the evidence or for which the 
degree of evidence needed to justify them is merely subjective.
The fact that identity beliefs are in turn robust and subjectively true has 
often led collective movements that are firmly linked to questions of identity 
(especially ethnic or religious identity) to possess a component of irrationality 
and to continue to pursue their objectives in spite of repeated failures. The 
case of the so-called Basque liberation movement and the terrorist group eTA 
that is tied to the movement is revealing in this sense (Casquete 2003). That 
the movement has survived as long as it has can be explained only by what 
some Basques believe it means to be Basque, a belief that is as robust as it is 
subjectively true. Social identities are based on socially constructed, shared, 
and reinforced beliefs about the meaning of a certain social self, beliefs that 
do not have to be true, although it is essential that the social agents believe 
that they are. In fact, in many cases identity beliefs cannot be rigorously 
true or false as there is no empirical basis for their essentialist affirmations: 
there is no empirical fact with regard to “being Basque” that supports the 
universal affirmation “we Basques are like this or like that.” Yet those who 
hold that belief will hold it as being true. If the major premise of a practical 
syllogism is based on falsifiable beliefs, it can be rebutted rationally by 
providing new information. The subjective robustness of identity beliefs, 
however, means that the practical syllogism that leads to action cannot be 
refuted rationally from outside and is rational from inside, internally. given 
the major premise, the agent is not irrational. However, this same major 
premise is based on nonfalsifiable beliefs—its semantics is a social construct—
and therefore cannot be refuted by the same epistemic rationality. Surely this 
is one of the reasons why identity beliefs are not transformed by means of 
Bayesian learning, unlike the beliefs of rational choice models. The Bayesian 
models of learning (Breen 1999) assume that people act according to their 
prior beliefs and that they modify these beliefs to make room for others 
(posterior beliefs) in light of the outcome of their actions. In these models it 
is assumed that individuals assign a positive value to the objective truth of 
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their beliefs and the efficient accumulation of evidence, two assumptions that 
are often alien to identity beliefs.
3. Social Identity Embeds a Clearly Emotional Component
The above discussion does not exhaust the complexity of identity 
beliefs. Indeed, another dimension must be added, namely, that identity 
beliefs are “emotion laden.” Basically, what this means is that beliefs are 
accompanied by feelings. In her brilliant studies on classic ethics and 
Aristotle in particular, Martha Nussbaum (1986, 1994) emphasized that 
there are certain things—goods—that cannot be valued properly if our 
feelings about them are not adequate, that is, if our beliefs about such goods 
do not provide a given emotional charge. One cannot adequately conceive 
of the (relational) good of friendship or love if one does not believe that 
such a friend or lover is irreplaceable and does not fear losing her or him. 
Belief in the irreplaceability of the person who is the object of our erotic 
desire is essential if we are to properly value our love for her or for him, to 
understand love itself. If someone loves without this belief, Nussbaum 
would say, she does not know what it means to love. But since that belief 
embeds the fear of loss, which is passion, the conclusion is that we cannot 
understand love if we do not feel that fear.
This line of reasoning, which is currently supported by empirical research 
in cognitive science (Damasio 1994; Bechara and Damasio 2005), can be 
extended to say that identity beliefs are also accompanied by feelings and 
emotions, although not in a contingent or casual way but in a necessary and 
constitutive manner.17 Thus, we cannot perceive of ourselves as being 
Christians or Basques or Muslims if we do not hold certain feelings of pride 
or happiness or of mistrust and eventual hatred toward those who are unlike 
us (Smith 1999). On the other hand, as Nussbaum also points out in her 
interpretation and defense of stoic cosmopolitanism, there are emotional 
benefits in the fact of belonging: loyalties and identity ties (the more local the 
stronger the ties) provide the individual with an enormous amount of 
psychological security, they make a cozy nest of group certainties, they 
17. It should come as no surprise that the externalist conception of rational choice rejects 
the explanatory value of emotions: “explanations of ethnic conflict often invoke emotions. 
Unfortunately, explaining ethnic conflict as emotional may not be explaining it at all or may 
be explaining aspects of it given that it happens. The part we most need to explain is why the 
behavior happens, why such behavior is ethnically oriented” (Hardin 1995, 56). But to explain 
why the behavior happens it is often necessary to consider the emotional aspect, although this 
aspect does not explain everything. Remember that one component of Fearon’s definition is 
the feeling of pride that identity causes.
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comfort the individual with direct recognition (Pizzorno 1986; Nussbaum 
1997; Hogg and Mullin 1999). Thus, when we solve the practical syllogism 
of identity and act in a certain way, we not only gain the benefits of internal 
coherence but also laterally reinforce the emotional benefits of belonging. It 
goes without saying that although all of this seems to wrap human behavior 
in shadows of irrationality, it continues to be comprehensible.
Rational choice theory has overlooked emotions, in spite of the role that 
they play in providing pleasure, satisfaction, and utility (elster 1996, 1386). 
It should come as no surprise that little effort has been dedicated to the 
study of the ties between identity and emotion. In the formal models of 
rational choice, beliefs and desires are taken as given, but emotions are not 
even mentioned; they simply do not exist. The fact that emotions have 
traditionally been considered irrational—and in this sense rational choice 
has been faithful to its own Humean tradition—has led to their exclusion 
from the realm of rational choice theory. Whatever the case may be, it 
seems clear that emotions are constitutive of identity beliefs. Thus, if the 
internalist version of rational choice theory wants to include the former in 
its models, it must also include the latter.
4. Identity Beliefs Form Complex but Open Structures
Imagine that someone says “I am X” and “being X means that I smoke a 
cigar at 5:00 everyday.” If being X only meant that, my identity would be a 
simple one as it would motivate only one action. Yet social identities are not 
so simple. They are not so simple because they are based on complex belief 
structures.18 As we saw above, being Christian means very different but 
interconnected things. Indeed, empirical research may be able to even 
demonstrate the connection between identity belief structures, for example, 
that Christians tend to vote for the Right in elections. This could be because 
of the fact that Christianity tends to indirectly give rise to conservative beliefs 
about social reality. To put it another way, identity belief structures can have 
their own epistemic power and lead to other beliefs by establishing connections 
between an individual’s different identities. Obviously, this potential coherence 
can be thwarted by the coexistence of conflicting structures.19 
18. In which it is inferred that not all beliefs about oneself constitute an identity belief. “I am 
dehydrated” is a belief about myself that is not an identity belief. Social identity can be con-
ceived of as a complex system of beliefs about oneself and about the world, but, obviously, 
not all beliefs about oneself have to do with identity.
19. Social identity involves complex sets of beliefs, but given that a person may have a diver-
sity of social identities, these sets can be contradictory, thus creating tension and uncertainty 
in the individual (see Aguiar and de Francisco 2002).
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However, given that belief structures are sets of meanings that form a 
shared semantics, they are subject to revision and reinterpretation. As we said 
above, there is no closed and definitive agreement about those semantics. 
Consequently, this permits the individual to negotiate internally to resolve her 
own conflict of interests or the conflict that arises as a result of incompatible 
prescriptions (Parfit 1984; Vescio et al. 1999). The agent may want to fit into 
the ideal social categories that constitute her identity, but she may lower her 
semantics—her demands—to satisfy other desires or needs; including that of 
belonging to—and being accepted by—other reference groups. She may also 
lower the emotional level of her identity beliefs with a view to maintaining 
other maximizing strategies, or she may reinterpret her identity beliefs to 
make them compatible with other beliefs. For example, voting for the left 
may involve the explicit reconsideration of what one understands by being 
Christian. Identity beliefs therefore form complex but open structures.
Conclusion
In this article, we have rejected externalist approaches to identity and 
examined internalists’ attempts to incorporate identity into rational choice 
models. In principle, this should pose no problems given that accommodating 
identity to socially typified behavior can have a symbolic utility (it reduces or 
eliminates the cost of deviation and also provides emotional benefits) and 
thus can be incorporated into an individual’s utility function—as the preference 
of a person for expressing her social being. We have also seen how this 
process is possible only from an internalist interpretation of rational choice 
theory as identity involves unavoidable mental processes and internal reasons 
that cannot be reduced to preferences revealed in choices.
Yet it is not such a simple task to include social identity in a rational 
choice model. It is not easy because, as we have argued, behavior motivated 
by identity ties and the behavior of rational choice models respond to two 
different rationales. In the case of the former, there is a logical internal 
coherence based on the accommodation (correspondence or coincidence) 
of behavior to the expectations prescribed by the ideal social category. In 
the latter case, it follows a logic of utility maximization given the beliefs 
and desires of the agent. The problem is that the two lines of logic not 
only are different but also do not have to be cumulative or compatible. 
Often, resolving the practical identity syllogism involves renouncing 
private utility maximizations. On the other hand, the two rationales may 
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become increasingly incompatible depending on the emotions involved in 
social identity, that is, in beliefs about oneself socially shaped. emotions 
cannot be taken as given as they are constitutive of identity beliefs, and 
depending on their intensity they can block the maximizing motivations in 
the strict sense of the term.20 In social phenomena such as ethnic violence, 
religious fundamentalism, or nationalism, in which identity beliefs and 
intense emotions (fear, hatred, revenge) are completely intertwined, neither 
externalist nor internalist rational choice theories are well armed to explain 
social action because it is almost impossible to suppose that people are 
maximizing something.21 Moreover, we have seen how in less intense cases 
identity belief structures could be open to revision and reinterpretation, thus 
permitting individuals “to negotiate” both the meanings and the emotional 
component of their identity beliefs to resolve their internal conflicts.
Would it be possible, then, to reflect these complexities in a broader 
model of rational choice? Would this not involve the dangerous multiplication 
of assumptions and lead to a tremendous loss of methodological parsimony? 
While these questions serve to express our reservations, there is something 
that is unquestionable, namely, that our analysis of identity in terms of 
beliefs strongly points to the need for a linguistic analysis to gain a full 
understanding of human behavior (Asher 1986). Beliefs are mental events, 
and practical syllogisms are (or refer to) mental processes.22 However, “our 
sentences provide the only measure of the mental” (Davidson 2001, 77). 
When we speak of social identities, we refer to beliefs about the social 
world and about ourselves insofar as we are members of that world. We are 
speaking, then, of meaning, of shared meaning, of semantics that are 
socially constructed through language. In this case, what individuals say 
about themselves appears to be a central factor that must be analyzed if we 
are to understand their behavior. Identity beliefs are internal to the group, 
to the members of the group who claim to have them. The question about 
how can we broaden rational choice models turns then into the question 
about how can we broaden their theoretical foundations to include identity 
20. This could translate into degrees of identification with the norms that are established in 
accordance with the roles with which the individual identifies (see Montgomery 2000, 
264-66). Obviously, if the degree of identification is low, there is more room for alternative 
maximizing motivations.
21. Formally, it is always possible to argue that people are maximizing something but paying 
the high price of proposing a tautological proposition.
22. Aristotle himself viewed the practical syllogism as a logical ex post interpretation of a 
psychological or mental process (see the classic article by F. C. S. Schiller 1917), although the 
process is assumed to be internal.
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beliefs. A first step would be to understand better the nature of beliefs about 
oneself and their indexical, social, emotional, and linguistic character, even 
if we have to go far beyond rational choice theory.
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